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Under conditions of market equilibrium, the distribution of capital income follows a Pareto power law, with
an exponent that characterizes the given equilibrium. Here, a simple taxation scheme is proposed such that the
post-tax capital income distribution remains an equilibrium distribution, albeit with a different exponent. This
taxation scheme is shown to be progressive, and its parameters can be simply derived from (i) the total amount
of tax that will be levied, (ii) the threshold selected above which capital income will be taxed and (iii) the total
amount of capital income. The latter can be obtained either by using Piketty’s estimates of the capital/labor
income ratio or by fitting the initial Pareto exponent. Both ways moreover provide a check on the amount of
declared income from capital.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Da
I. INTRODUCTION
The distribution of income has been studied for a long
time in the economic literature, and has more recently be-
come a topic of investigation for statistical physicists turning
to econophysics [1–4]. The income distribution is character-
ized by a density function f (x) such that f (x)dx is the number
of individuals earning income between x and x + dx. From
the empirical data obtained from tax records, two different
regimes are readily distinguished. For income levels below
a certain threshold xc, the distribution follows and exponen-
tial (Boltzmann) law, f (x) ∝ exp(−x/x¯), whereas for income
levels above xc the distribution is better fitted by a power law,
f (x) ∝ x−γ. Note that for the bottom incomes, a deviation
from the Boltzmann law is visible. This is due to redistri-
bution (such as social security benefits) which lifts a certain
amount of people above a poverty threshold xpov.
For income above the poverty level but below xc the distri-
bution is very well fitted by a Gibbs distribution [5, 6]. Tax
records that keep track of the source of income indicate that
income in this regime is dominated by labor income (salaries
and wages) [7]. In this regime, economic transactions can
be modelled by additive processes [4, 6]: money exchanges
hands between agents but the total amount of money is con-
served over the transaction. For example, each month an em-
ployee gets a certain sum of money added to his account,
and this sum is subtracted from the account of the employer’s
company. Using this principle of local money conservation,
Dragulescu and Yakovenko [5] have shown that the equilib-
rium distribution of money over the agents involved in addi-
tive transactions follows a Boltzmann-Gibbs exponential dis-
tribution. Note that this is a strongly simplified model of eco-
nomic activity: it is clear that in reality global money conser-
vation is violated. Indeed, banks can issue (or recall) loans,
thereby increasing (or decreasing) the total money supply.
This brings us to the higher incomes, x > xc. As noted
already by Pareto in 1897, these follow a power law [8].
Records that keep track of the source of income reveal that in-
come in the power law regime is mainly capital income (rent,
profits, interests, dividends,...) [9, 10]. For these types of
income, economic transactions are better modeled by multi-
plicative processes [6, 11, 12]. In contrast to a wage worker, a
rentier expects that at each time step the money in his invest-
ment is multiplied by an interest factor. For such processes,
it is log(x) rather than x which is conserved locally, and this
leads naturally to a power law rather than an exponential equi-
librium distribution [13].
The change from exponential regime to power-law regime
occurs in a narrow interval [14, 15] around xc, allowing to
separate not only the income in two sources (Mlab from labor
and Mcap from capital), but also the population in two groups
(Nlab and Ncap, respectively). Of course, these are not clearly
delineated, and also people filing tax forms for income below
xc have a portion of their income coming from returnon cap-
ital, but the problem can be greatly simplified by taking the
main source of income to be the entire income. The value
xc separating the exponential from the power-law regimes lies
between three and four times the average income in the expo-
nential part of the distribution [14–16].
The question that I wish to address in this paper is how to
levy taxes such that the immediate after-tax income distribu-
tion remains in equilibrium (i.e. of Boltzmann type for x < xc,
and of Pareto type for x > xc). The parameters (x¯ and γ) of the
pre-tax and after-tax distributions will be different, reflecting
the change from one equilibrium to another rather than a shift
to a non-equilibrium distribution. Free-market advocates can
argue that this type of equilibrium-to-equilibrium taxation is
the least disruptive choice. The conjecture behind this is that
when the income distribution is pushed strongly out of equi-
librium the market is far from optimized as transactions that
are wished for may not take place. Hence a taxation scheme
that results in an out-of-equilibrium after-tax income distri-
bution would be more detrimental to the market. Of course,
whether any scheme is just or desirable is well beyond the
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, given the current debate
taking place (in the USA, the UK and the EU) of how to tax
the rich, I believe the results presented here can contribute to
an informed discussion.
II. CAPITAL AND LABOR INCOME FOR BELGIUM
To illustrate the results with numbers, I use my home coun-
try of Belgium as an example, taking xc ≈ 100 ke. There were
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FIG. 1. (color online) The (annual) income distribution in Belgium
in 2014 as obtained from personal tax records [17], in bins of dx = 1
ke. The distribution follows a Boltzmann law (dashed line) except
for the lowest income. Redistributive taxation lifts people with an in-
come below xpov (area shaded in dark red) above this poverty thresh-
old (area shaded in light blue).
Ntot = 6.26 × 10
6 people filing a non-zero income tax record
in Belgium in 2014, the latest year with complete information
[17]. Of these, Ncap = 1.73 × 10
5 (or 2.8% of the total) in-
dicate an income above xc. The remaining Nlab = 6.09 × 10
6
are in the exponential regime and represent a cumulative in-
come of Mlab = 170.6 Ge. As seen in Fig. 1, there is a strong
deviation of the exponential regime for income levels below
xpov = 13.25 ke: this is the poverty threshold. People below
this threshold receive social security benefits lifting them to
roughly the threshhold level and slightly above.
Estimating the amount of capital income Mcap for Belgium
is difficult to do based on tax forms. The reason is that not all
sources of capital income need to be declared in Belgium: For
instance, income from renting out apartments or offices is not
declared. Piketty [18] provides an alternative way to estimate
Mcap from Mlab. His study of the historical ratio between cap-
ital income and labor income for developed economies shows
that this income has its own slow dynamics over time. Cur-
rently, the capital share of income in rich countries stands at
25-30% of national income. The dynamics of the capital/labor
income ratio is slow enough such that the income distribu-
tion is close to equilibrium at any time. Taking the above-
mentioned capital share of the national income into account
results in an estimate[? ] of Mcap ≈ 60 Ge.
The additive class, xpov < x < xc is subject to the (normal-
ized) Boltzmann-Gibbs distrubution
flab(x) =
Nlab
x¯
exp(−x/x¯), (1)
with x¯ = Mlab/Nlab the average income in this class.
The multiplicative class is subject to the power law distri-
bution
fcap(x > xc) =
(γ − 1)Ncap
xc
(x/xc)
−γ. (2)
The Pareto parameter γ is fixed by Mcap through the normal-
ization Mcap =
∫
∞
xc
x fcap(x)dx by
γ =
2Mcap − Ncapxc
Mcap − Ncapxc
. (3)
This restricts γ > 2, since Mcap > Ncapxc. The estimate Mcap =
60 Ge based on Piketty’s observations corresponds to γ =
2.4. This value is in agreement with the estimate of γ ≈ 2.5
obtained by Silva and Yakovenko [16].
Eq. (3) can also be inverted, so that an empirical fit yielding
γ (in combination with xc and Ncap) may be used to estimate
the total amount of income from capital. Detailed data for
the high-income distribution is not publicly available in Bel-
gium, and as mentioned above, exemption of some capital in-
come sources in Belgium complicates data finding. However,
for countries with an obligation to declare all capital income,
Eq. 3 could be used to estimate the amount of undeclared in-
come and hence the level of tax evasion by rentiers. A simi-
lar proposal, based on deviations from the Pareto distribution,
was introduced to estimate the size of shadow banking [19].
III. TAXING CAPITAL INCOME
Suppose one wants to levy taxes to raise a given amount
∆M of money. For example, to bring all the poor to a mini-
mum wage of xpov, one would need
∆M =
∫ xc
0
(xc − x) flab(x)dx (4)
= Mlab
[
(xpov/x¯) − (1 − e
−xpov/x¯)
]
. (5)
Using the numbers listed above for Belgium, the topping up
of all lower incomes to xpov would require 16.4 Ge.
Suppose moreover that one wants to obtain the amount of
∆M by taxing capital income in such a way that the after-tax
capital income distribution follows again a Pareto law. The
post-tax power law distribution necessarily has a different ex-
ponent η > γ, given by
η =
2(Mcap − ∆M) − Ncapxc
Mcap − ∆M − Ncapxc
. (6)
In our Belgian example, this would mean a change from
γ = 2.41 to η = 2.66. To describe the taxation scheme, we
introduce a function X(x) that gives the post-tax net income
X as a function of the pre-tax income x. The distribution of
post-tax income is denoted by
f
post-tax
cap (X) =
(η − 1)Ncap
xc
(X/xc)
−η. (7)
This distribution has to obey
f
post-tax
cap (X)dX = fcap[x(X)]dx. (8)
Substituting the Pareto distributions in the above equation
yields a differential equation for X(x),
(η − 1)
x
1−η
c
X−η(x)
dX
dx
=
(γ − 1)
x
1−γ
c
x−γ. (9)
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FIG. 2. Taxation levels as a function of capital income, for different
values of the parameter τ, which is fixed by the amount of tax ∆M
that will be levied from the total capital income Mcap. The tax rate
is progressive and taxation starts at the income level xc separating
the Boltzmann-type labor income distribution from the Pareto-type
capital income distribution.
It solution depends on the parameter
τ =
γ − 1
η − 1
, (10)
and is given by
X(x) = x1−τc x
τ. (11)
As τ < 1, this solution corresponds to a weighted geo-
metric averaging between the capital income and the thresh-
old xc where main income switches from additive to multi-
plicative. For a pre-tax income x the corresponding tax rate
T (x) = (x − X)/x is given by
T (x) = 1 − (xc/x)
1−τ . (12)
This represents a progressive tax rate. Taking our example
τ = 0.85, and the resulting tax rate is shown as the full curve
in Fig. 2. Whereas for a capital income of 120 ke (slightly
above the threshold when one can be called a rentier or “rich”)
the tax rate is about 3%, at 200 ke it has risen to 10%, dou-
bling again to 20% for 500 ke.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Eqs. (6),(10) and (12) represent a simple taxation scheme
that preserves the power law nature of capital income. In order
to implement it, policy makers need to select a threshold xc of
income from capital above which the tax is levied, and choose
a value of τ, or equivalently, an amount ∆M of money that
the tax should raise. The basic idea behind preserving the
power law is that this law represents a distribution in which
the market is in equilibrium.
Free market proponents claim, in the first fundamental the-
orem of welfare economics, that a competetive market pro-
duces a (non-unique) Pareto efficient equilibrium outcome.
Moreover, in this train of thought, a social planner could se-
lect the most suitable efficient outcome by lump sum transfers,
according to the second fundamental theorem. In this context,
the current proposal for taxation is precisely a way to organ-
ise a transfer that links one equilibrium for capital income to
another.
What if one would use the same logic to labor income?
Changing one Boltzmann distribution into another only re-
quires a scale change x → αx where α = 1 − ∆M/Mlab. This
corresponds to a proportional tax system (a “flat tax”, such as
a fixed sales tax). This is not always seen as the socially most
desirable outcome as it penalizes the low-income segment of
the population, who have less disposable income. In essence,
the current proposal represents a flat tax on log(x), modified
by the presence of a the threshold xc. Regardless of the desir-
ability debate, it is clear that proponents of a flat tax for labor
income who base their arguments on market efficiency, should
then logically advocate the current progressive tax on capital
income. Another commonly encountered argument for a flat
tax is its simplicity. In this respect, the proposal for a progres-
sive capital income taxation put forward in this paper offers a
scheme which, at least to a physicist, is of similar simplicity.
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